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Abstract  
We investigate whether there are any identifiable differences in market perceptions of 
rating news released by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch following the establishment of a 
new regulatory regime in July 2011, when the European Securities and Markets 
Authority assumed responsibility for rating agencies’ regulation in Europe. We focus 
the analysis on the impact of bank rating actions on stock returns and volatility during 
2008-2013. Among the intended effects of the new regulatory regime are reduced 
market impact of rating actions and enhanced market stability, yet we find very mixed 
evidence. Differentials in market responses across CRAs are identified. 
 
JEL classification: G15; G21; G24.   
Keywords: Regulatory change; Bank rating downgrade; Share price volatility; 
European debt crisis. 
 
* Corresponding author, Professor of Finance, Bangor Business School, Bangor University, Bangor, 
LL57 2DG, UK. Tel.: +44 (0) 1248 382176. E-mail: owain.apgwilym@bangor.ac.uk. 
1	
1. Introduction  
The recent European debt crisis presented a uniquely challenging period for credit 
rating agencies (CRAs), triggering increased scrutiny of their relative performance. CRAs 
were partly blamed for the recent financial crisis and the subsequent effects on the global 
economy. This paper investigates the impact of the recently established regulatory regime for 
CRAs operating in Europe (see Section 2). We set out the key motivations and milestones in 
the regime overseen by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which was 
assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU in July 2011. ESMA could play an 
important role in restoring the confidence of investors and market participants in the rating 
industry as well as enhancing financial stability. ESMA seeks to mitigate overreliance on 
credit ratings, hence reducing market reactions or overreactions to credit rating actions. 
However, some aspects of the proposed and implemented regulations might lead to 
unintended consequences. The desire to reduce mechanistic market reactions is somewhat 
contradicted by the inherent process of endorsement and approval of CRAs. 
The empirical investigation in the paper aims to establish whether there is any 
identifiable difference in market perceptions of CRA actions in Europe across a sample 
period encompassing the establishment of the new regulatory regime. The analysis considers 
multiple CRAs (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) in a competitive setting and studies differences in 
their rating opinions. We specifically investigate the impacts of bank rating actions by the 
largest three CRAs on European banks’ stock returns and volatility during January 2008 to 
December 2013. We also examine whether there is any change in market reactions to rating 
news after the establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011. 
Prior literature demonstrates that corporates’ stock returns respond strongly to rating 
downgrades from Moody’s and S&P, while reactions to rating upgrades are much more 
muted (e.g. Hand et al. 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001, Li et al., 2006; Behr and Güttler, 
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2008; Halek and Eckles, 2010). Some recent studies investigate links between sovereign risk 
and domestic banks. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) find significant spillovers between bank and 
sovereign credit risk during the European debt crisis, providing evidence in favour of an asset 
holding channel and a collateral channel. Alsakka et al. (2014) show that sovereign rating 
actions have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in Europe during the recent crisis. 
Correa et al. (2014) find that sovereign rating downgrades (not upgrades) have a large 
significant impact on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger 
support from their governments. 
The literature linked to bank ratings is relatively limited, and mainly focused on their 
determinants. Caporale et al. (2011) find that country-specific factors (in the form of 
heterogeneous intercepts) affect EU countries’ bank ratings. Shen et al. (2012) find that larger 
bank assets and higher sovereign credit ratings boost bank credit ratings. Hau et al. (2013) 
find that bank characteristics significantly affect bank rating quality assigned to banks in 
Europe and the United States by the three largest CRAs. Hau et al. (2013) also show that 
CRAs tend to assign higher ratings to large banks and those banks that provide CRAs with a 
large quantity of securities rating business. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research which examines the effect of 
the establishment of a new regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA) on the market perceptions of credit 
rating actions. We also fill a clear void in the literature on the effect of bank rating actions on 
European banks’ stock returns and volatility during the recent crisis. Our main findings are 
summarised as follows. The impact of rating downgrades on the abnormal returns and share 
prices volatility varies across CRAs. There is mixed evidence in this sample on whether the 
establishment of ESMA oversight has had its intended effect of reducing market impact of 
CRAs or promoted market stability. S&P and Moody’s downgrades trigger stronger negative 
abnormal returns, while these effects did not exist before July 2011. The regulatory change 
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has dampened the negative abnormal returns reported following bank rating downgrades by 
Fitch prior to July 2011. For share price volatility, we identify reductions following S&P 
downgrades. This effect did not exist before July 2011. Moody’s rating downgrades trigger 
modest increases (decreases) in volatility after (before) July 2011, while Fitch rating 
downgrades have insignificant impact on banks’ share price volatility.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the regulatory 
developments affecting the rating industry in Europe, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 
presents the methodology, Section 5 analyses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Regulatory developments affecting the rating industry in Europe  
2.1. ‘Reactive’ phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs 
Up until 2010, there was no direct EU legislation under which CRAs would fall. Self-
regulation following the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
Code was an indirect form of supervision applied voluntarily by institutions (Johnson, 2004).  
The recent regulatory efforts concerning credit ratings originate from the US sub-prime crisis 
where CRAs were too permissive in rating structured finance products. The sub-prime crisis 
spread extensively to other financial sectors and shed light on the importance of ratings in the 
financial and economic stability (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). The G-7 Ministers and the 
Central Banks Governors requested the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to study the origins 
of the turbulence and to advocate possible actions. This resulted in a report published in April 
2008 (See Table 1). 
During the G-20 summit in Washington 2008, member countries “aimed to ensure 
that no institution, product or market was left unregulated at EU and international levels” 
(European Commission (EC), 2013). Since there was no regulatory oversight of the CRAs in 
many jurisdictions, including Europe, this issue had to be tackled. The regime was shaped by 
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international agreement with participation of the G-20, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
IOSCO (see Table 1). The EC classified the main deficiencies of CRAs into three main areas:  
failures in integrity, failures in reliability and lack of transparency. In December 2009, EC 
outlined a new set of laws involving CRAs within the European jurisdiction. The first aspect 
focuses on registration procedures which require that financial firms in the EU obtain ratings 
only from certified CRAs. Secondly, explicit rules aimed at reducing conflicts of interest 
were introduced. Sanctions include governance requirements, inspections of CRAs, increased 
transparency and enhancement of methodologies and ratings quality.  
Many academics and EC commentators identified problems related to limited 
competition among CRAs. The problems of mechanistic reliance on ratings were recognised 
by FSB/G-20 during the Toronto summit in June 2010. In October 2010, FSB released 
Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings which applies to standards, laws and 
regulations at the international level (FSB, 2010). 
 
2.2. ‘Implementation’ phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs 
Following the G-20 summit, the European Parliament and the Council formed EU 
regulation on CRAs (CRA I Regulation), valid from December 2010 (EC, 2011a) (See Table 
1). This regulation was amended in May 2011 (CRA II) to respond to the creation of the 
European credit ratings’ supervisory authority, named the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) (EC, 2011b). ESMA was assigned with the responsibility for certifying 
and overlooking actions of CRAs from July 2011. In November 2011, EC released a proposal 
to amend the existing CRA regulation, known as CRA III regulation (EC, 2011c ), as well as 
a proposal for a Directive on the use of external ratings by market participants (EC, 2011d). 
In January, the 2012 Executive Director of ESMA reported to the European Parliament on its 
progress of implementing revised regulation for CRAs (ESMA, 2012). 
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According to the European Central Bank (ECB, 2012), regulations on CRAs were 
applied from a micro-prudential perspective and intended to restore the confidence of 
investors and market participants as well as enhance financial stability. The main actions 
were intended to (i) reduce excessive reliance on credit ratings, (ii) alleviate risks associated 
with spillover effects, (iii) develop a stronger rating market to improve the overall quality of 
rating practices, (iv) safeguard compensation systems for investors, and (v) strengthen the 
independence of CRAs and the soundness of rating processes and methodologies with a view 
to enhanced ratings quality. 
The European Council and European Parliament released technical standards for CRAs 
in March 2012, followed by processes for enforcing fines and penalties on CRAs in July 
(Official Journal of European Union (OJEU), 2012). The European Parliament and European 
Council agreed on a new Directive on CRAs in Europe in November 2012. At the time, 
sovereign ratings were a primary focus, with the directive requiring sovereign rating actions 
to be published after the close of markets and at least one hour before they reopen (EC, 
2012). The legislation introduced a regime of civil liability which will enable an issuer to sue 
the CRA if proven to be a victim of misconduct or negligence of the agency (OJEU, 2012).  
On 16 January 2013, European Parliament (2013) voted in favour of the new tougher 
CRA rules. CRAs are required to prepare yearly calendars with dates when unsolicited 
ratings will be released. Sovereign ratings are to be reviewed at least every six months. Dates 
of publishing outlooks, where relevant, are also required in advance. Moreover, issuers are to 
be informed about rating decisions 12 hours before they are made public. The EC is required 
to report to the Parliament by 1 July 2016 and reassess the state of affairs and propose 
modifications to regulatory proposals. One of the tasks recommended by ESMA involves re-
evaluation of the consequences of the “issuer pays” model. 
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Amendments to the CRA III regulation entered into force in June 2013 (OJEU, 2013a). 
The accompanying Directive is required to be implemented by December 2014 (OJEU, 
2013b). The regulation applies all principal requirements outlined in the initial Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009, to rating outlooks and watches. In December 2013, as part of its 
supervision and policy work plan, ESMA published a press release on its investigation of the 
three biggest CRAs (ESMA, 2013a). The researched areas include governance and 
organisation, expertise and resources used for rating purposes and procedures involved in 
releasing ratings. The authority compliments CRAs on adequacy of resources, training 
possibilities, practices during committee discussions and consistency and continuity of rating 
sovereigns amongst others. The report also reveals deficiencies which could lead to lower 
quality and reliability of sovereign ratings. In many instances ESMA proposes possible 
remedial actions.  
In its Annual Report 2013, ESMA points to six action plans for CRAs conducted 
during 2012 and 2013 (ESMA, 2014a). ESMA comments on the record keeping practices and 
strengthening of the compliance function by CRAs. Deficiencies have been found in the areas 
of validating the rating methodologies and the security of IT systems used by CRAs. Further, 
the regulator fears that the revenue generating publishing activities of rating analysts might 
pose potential conflicts of interest whereas contracting external public relations agencies by 
some of the CRAs threatens the confidentiality of the data. ESMA’s activity in 2013 
included: (i) bank rating methodology, (ii) sovereign rating process investigation, (iii) 
monitoring of structured finance ratings by four CRAs, and (iv) deficiencies in publication 
controls. There are currently 23 registered and two certified CRAs in the EU (ESMA, 2014b). 
Amongst the registered CRAs, Fitch, Moody’s and S&P represent 87 percent of the total 
market share (ESMA, 2013b).  
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2.3. ‘Enhancement phase’ of the EU Regulation of CRAs 
ESMA’s future plans concentrate on producing numerous technical reports to the EC in 
relation to the structured finance industry and its efforts to minimise references in laws and 
regulations to external ratings (ESMA, 2014a). ESMA intends to enhance the existing 
collaboration with the IOSCO Committee and finalise amendments to the Code of Conduct 
for CRAs. There are proposals to form a European sovereign debt creditworthiness centre 
which requires ESMA’s technical assistance.  
Following the G-20 summit in 2013, the FSB urged regulators to speed up the process 
of reducing reliance on ratings in line with the agreements in October 2012 (see FSB, 2012). 
In order to accelerate this process, peer reviews aimed at helping national authorities in 
reaching objectives were conducted. This involves two phases: the initial stage recorded 
references to ratings made in laws and regulations across jurisdictions, published in a report 
in August 2013 (see FSB, 2013). The second, ongoing, phase concentrates on the strategies 
applied by authorities to execute the FSB Principles expected by end of 2015 (progress was 
published FSB, 2014). It is reported that approaches differ across jurisdictions and financial 
sectors and the developments are often uneven. For instance, private agreements, collateral 
contracts and risk-prudential frameworks for intermediaries rely on external ratings. Further, 
the report discourages national authorities and market participants from applying measures 
substituting CRAs ratings as they might lead to procyclicality and herding among investors. 
The attention was drawn especially to internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for which 
reliability, comparability and transparency among others are questionable (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2013).  
In the current phase of the increasing regulatory oversight of the CRA industry, little is 
yet known about its effectiveness as it is an ongoing process. Certain proposals need to be 
carefully evaluated. For instance, the methodology requirements might pose a threat to the 
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independence of the CRAs (ESMA, 2012, EC, 2012). Authorities themselves face difficulties 
such as technological improvements and choices between competition and stability in ratings 
needs to be made (ESMA, 2012). The increased responsibilities and the criteria set by the 
Parliament do not go in hand with timing of the reforms and imposed deadlines, thus causing 
a considerable strain on ESMA’s capabilities. 
 
3. Data sample  
We investigate the reactions of banks’ stock returns and volatilities to bank rating 
actions by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch during the period January 2008 to December 2013. Since 
July 2011, ESMA assumed responsibility for the ongoing regulatory reform and oversight of 
CRAs operating in Europe. The sample period is selected in order to overlap the 
establishment of the new regulatory regime, with the aim of capturing any significant change 
in market perceptions of rating actions. The sample is initially based the European banks 
included in the 2011 EU stress test. There were a total of 91 banks, from 21 European 
countries. However, some banks are excluded because they are not listed; hence have no 
share price information. This reduces the sample to 44 banks from 17 European countries 
(see Table 2). The daily share prices, national stock indices and other financial data of the 
sampled banks are retrieved from Data Stream.  
Bank senior unsecured long-term debt ratings are collected from Bloomberg. Figure 1 
presents the distribution of daily ratings of banks for each CRA. It is worth noting that none 
of the banks are rated at the triple-A rating category. This is consistent with the findings of 
Alsakka et al. (2014) that the European bank ratings are frequently constrained by the 
sovereign ceiling during the crisis period, and therefore the average bank ratings tend to be 
lower than the average sovereign ratings by 1 or 2 notches. Only 15% of banks ratings’ 
observations were at speculative-grade rating (BB+/Ba1 or below) during the sample period. 
About 25% of the daily observations are AA+/Aa1, AA/Aa2 or AA-/Aa3 rating categories, 
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and about 45% at A+/A1, A/A2 or A-/A3 rating categories. These proportions reflect the 
developed nature of the sample countries. The percentage of banks’ ratings observations at 
investment-grade (BBB-/Baa3 or above) by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch dropped from 89%, 
97% and 95%  in the pre- July 2011 sub-sample to 71%, 68% and 78% in the post- July 2011 
sub-sample. 
We identify actual rating changes according to mapped 20-notch numerical ratings 
(AAA/Aaa = 20, AA+/Aa1 = 19, AA/Aa2 = 18 … CCC-/Caa3 = 2, CC/Ca, SD-S/C = 1) by 
notches on the basis of daily intervals. Table 3 reports the numbers of rating events released 
by the CRAs on the sampled banks during January 2008 - December 2013. This reveals a 
strong bank rating downgrade trend in European countries as a consequence of the sovereign 
debt crisis, with the total number of rating downgrades far exceeding the number of upgrades. 
For the sample, there are 126 (5) bank rating downgrades (upgrades) by S&P, 171 (4) by 
Moody’s, and 120 (8) by Fitch. The limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs 
on the sampled banks during the period makes empirical investigation of the effects of 
upgrades (in Sections 4 and 5) infeasible.  
Moody’s greater willingness to use downgrades of more than one-notch is notable. 
Approximately a quarter of bank rating downgrades by S&P and Fitch are of more than one-
notch, compared to 43% by Moody’s. Almost all of the rating downgrade events are “clean” 
i.e. are not followed by rating downgrade from other CRA(s) within at least 1 week. There 
are only 43 ‘unclean’ rating events which involve more than one CRA taking rating 
downgrade action on the same bank within one week.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Event study 
We employ standard event study methodology to measure the reaction of bank share 
prices and volatility to bank rating downgrades. We examine changes in cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR), Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)1 and intraday high-low range (i.e. 
stock volatility) during time windows: [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 5], [0, 22], whereby day 0 is the day 
when a rating downgrade is released. Because all the sample banks are located in Europe, 
there is no time zone issue in identifying event dates. Therefore, we focus on one-day 
windows (i.e. [-1, 0] and [0, 1]) which capture the immediate impact of rating actions (if 
any). This is especially relevant to the intraday high-low range which measures daily market 
volatility or intraday heterogeneity in market participants’ views of the banks’ valuations.  
Abnormal stock return (AR) is estimated using the market mode, as follows: 
)( ttt RERAR   
Where            Mtt RRE   ˆ+ˆ)(   
Rt is the continuously compounded rate of return for stock i on day t. 
RtM is the continuously compounded rate of return for the national stock market index where 
the bank is listed, on day t. 
 ˆ and ˆ are the estimated parameters of the market model. The estimation window is a 200-
day rolling window from day -250 to day -50 (i.e. pre-event window). The reason for 
selecting day -50 (not day -1) is to avoid any possible effects of rating anticipation.  
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during time windows s are estimated as follows: 



s
i
itts ARCAR
0
,       
																																																								
1 BHAR is proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997), and is examined in order to disentangle the longer-term 
impacts of rating actions. 
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Where s = 1 ≡ time window is [0, 1]; s = 5 ≡ time window is [0, 5]; and s = 22 ≡ time 
window is [0, 22]. 
Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) during time windows s are computed as 
follows: 
   



 
s
i
it
s
i
itts RERBHAR
00
, )(11  
Stock volatility is captured by intraday range (Parkinson, 1980) which is measured by the 
logarithm of intraday high over intraday low prices. The intraday range is estimated as: 
)
Low
High
ln(
ln
Range
it
it
it 22
1  
         Prior research shows that the daily range is significantly more efficient than the realized 
volatility. Alizadeh et al. (2002) and Brandt and Diebold (2006) demonstrate that the range-
based volatility estimator appears robust to microstructure noise such as bid-ask bounce. 
         We conduct the tests in the event study on the pre- and post- July 2011 sub-samples. In 
order to avoid any possible bias due to the distribution of the sample means, we conduct both 
t-test and non-parametric tests. The non-parametric tests are sign- and Wilcoxon tests, testing 
whether the medians of CAR, BHAR and intraday high-low range during the time windows 
are significantly different to zero. 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis  
The multivariate analysis aims to control for multiple factors that may affect banks’ 
share prices and volatility, such as the levels of banks’ creditworthiness, bank size, book-to-
market, bank characteristics or country characteristics (e.g. Shen et al., 2012; Hau et al., 
2013). The following Equations are estimated: 
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
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
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k
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

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n
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,
k
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

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n
1k
,
k
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CARi,s is the cumulative daily abnormal return of bank i during time windows s around credit 
rating actions from each CRA. Time windows are restricted to [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 5] and [0, 
22]. Time windows [-1, 0] and [0, 1] convey the market movements when rating news is 
released, while time windows [0, 5] and [0, 22] capture market movements after rating news 
during 1 week and 1 month later.   
BHARi,s is the Buy-and-hold abnormal return of bank i over the time window s. 
ΔRangei,s is the cumulative daily change in the intraday high-low range of bank i stock prices 
over time window s. 	
ΔRatingi,t is the daily change in the rating level of bank i at time t.  
Dreg.change is a dummy variable for the regulatory change, taking the value of one when the 
regulatory regime has been established (i.e. post July 2011) and zero otherwise. We also 
include the interaction between ΔRating and Dreg.change in order to disentangle any impact(s) 
of the new regulatory regime on the market participants’ perceptions of CRAs’ actions. 
ΣXk is a set of control variables, including the current rating level of bank i, bank size 
(measured by the logarithm of total assets), book-to-market ratio, individual bank dummies 
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and year dummies. The current rating level of the bank is included to control for the financial 
and fundamental conditions of the bank. In other words, this is to control for the likelihood 
that less healthy banks (i.e. lower credit ratings) tend to experience more volatile changes in 
the dependent variables, i.e. returns and volatility. The bank size and Book-to-market ratio 
are included as they could explain the variation in returns to some extent (Fama and French, 
1992). Bank dummies and year dummies are included to control for individual bank 
characteristics and the business cycle. The individual bank characteristics should mop up 
country specifics or country characteristics.2 
The estimations of Equations (1), (2), and (3) are based on a sample of rating event 
days plus random bank-matched non-event days, drawn from the full sample excluding non-
event observations within one month before and after rating announcements. This is done in 
order to mitigate rating clustering and market noise issues (e.g. Ferreira & Gama, 2007, Tran 
et al., 2014). It is noteworthy that the sample consists of observations on non-consecutive 
days that may be very distant from each other. Therefore, estimations of the equations are not 
time series investigations.3 In line with prior literature, we expect rating downgrades to 
convey new information to the public, hence, trigger significant and negative impacts on 
stock return and volatility. We expect mixed or modest evidence on the impact of the new 
regulatory regime in terms of changing market perceptions of rating actions. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
2 We also carry out equivalent investigations using country dummies (instead of bank dummies) in order to 
control for country clustering or country characteristics. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively 
similar. 
3 We also conduct robustness tests by including lagged values of the dependent variables (i.e. CAR, BHAR, and 
intraday low-high range) to control for potential persistence in the dependent variables. The results are 
qualitatively similar (available upon request). 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Event study 
Tables 4-6 present the results of the event study. Overall, the findings present mixed 
evidence on the impact of the new regulatory regime on the market participants’ perceptions 
of CRAs actions. The responses of CAR and BHAR to bank rating downgrades are very 
similar (see Tables 4 and 5).4 Specifically, there is evidence of a shift in market participants’ 
perceptions of rating actions across CRAs. Prior to July 2011, reactions to Fitch downgrades 
are significant in each testing procedure. Within one week of Fitch downgrading a bank, the 
share prices decline by around 5-6 percentage points. This loss in share values is large 
compared to the reactions of returns to S&P downgrades which induce no significant reaction 
and Moody’s where much smaller reactions are found (around 1.5 percentage points; 
significant in the t-test, not the non-parametric tests).  
In contrast, in the post- July 2011 subsample, reactions to Fitch downgrades are no 
longer significant. This could be interpreted as indicating that the new regulation has been 
effective in its objective of dampening the market reactions to rating news. However, market 
responses to S&P and Moody’s actions have also altered. S&P downgrades trigger a 
significant impact on CARs. The impact is only very short-term, i.e. during the day when 
rating news is released and no further significant reaction is found in the next days. The 
magnitude of the negative abnormal return is about 1.15 percentage points (see Table 4). On 
the other hand, Moody’s downgrades induce longer lasting effects. The negative abnormal 
returns are reported up to one month after Moody’s bank rating downgrades. On the day of 
rating announcements from Moody’s, share values decrease by 0.6 percentage points and the 
reduction continues until one month later, and the magnitude of the reduction is also very 
																																																								
4 The result for time window [-1, 0] is absent from Table 5 because it would not differ from the result reported 
in Table 4.  
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large, i.e. over 5 percentage points (see Tables 4 and 5). A possible explanation could arise 
from different adjustments in the three CRAs’ policies in response to the regulation. 
Table 6 presents results for the intraday high-low range. The greater the high-low 
range, the higher is the stock price volatility. Overall, the findings of Table 6 show evidence 
of a shift in market participants’ perceptions of rating actions across CRAs which is 
consistent with the results in Tables 4 and 5. In the sub-sample prior to July 2011, S&P 
downgrades trigger an increase in the intraday high-low range of less than 1 percentage point, 
and only during very short time windows, i.e. [-1, 0] and [0, 1]. This indicates that S&P 
downgrades trigger an immediate and very short-lived negative impact on share price 
volatility. In the post July 2011 sub-sample, the t-test on the intraday high-low range shows a 
significant increase of about 0.6 percentage points in response to S&P downgrades. However, 
the impact of S&P downgrades post July 2011 is not short-lived. Interestingly, the measure of 
stock price volatility reduces significantly within one month following S&P downgrades.  
This pattern of market reactions is unexpected. Negative rating news (i.e. rating 
downgrades) often triggers negative market reactions (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and 
Piotroski, 2001; Li et al., 2006; Halek and Eckles, 2010). However, it is noteworthy that these 
papers examine assets’ returns. Table 6 presents results on asset volatility which behaves 
differently to asset returns (e.g. Beber and Brandt, 2009). Tran et al. (2014) illustrate that 
additional rating news (even negative rating news) could play a “confirmation” role and 
reduce market volatility. In other words, share price volatility reduces in response to S&P 
downgrades, which was not revealed prior to the regulatory regime changes. The direct 
implication is that the regulatory changes might contribute to enhance the transparency in the 
rating procedure, therefore, promote market stability in the sense that share prices are less 
volatile in response to S&P downgrades. 
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 Similarly, the measure of share price volatility reduces in response to Fitch 
downgrades. The reduction appears in both prior to- and post- July 2011 periods. There is 
clearer evidence of the reduction in the later period. Prior to July 2011, the measure of share 
price volatility reduces about 1 percentage point within one month following Fitch 
downgrades. Post July 2011, the reduction is strongly significant under each testing 
procedure (i.e. at the 1% level of significance), and is immediate when Fitch rating 
downgrades are released. This supports the view that the regulatory changes might contribute 
to enhanced market stability. 
However, the evidence from the reactions to Moody’s downgrades contradicts this. 
The measure of share price volatility reduces prior to July 2011 but the reduction is not 
significant post July 2011. It is noteworthy that the pattern of reactions from abnormal returns 
and Buy-and-hold abnormal returns is also changed, but in the opposite fashion (compared to 
those of share volatility). The impact of Moody’s downgrades becomes strongly significant 
and the magnitude of the reactions in abnormal returns is economically meaningful after July 
2011. A possible explanation could be that around the time milestone, there might be a 
systematic change in the information content of rating downgrades which are released by 
each CRA. Further analysis on the sample lends support to this conjecture. There is a 
significant change in rating policies across the CRAs around the time milestone, at least 
relating to the sampled banks. Prior to July 2011, Moody’s ratings are usually higher than 
S&P and Fitch ratings on the same banks. The proportion of Moody’s ratings which are lower 
than both S&P and Fitch ratings on the same banks is only 2.5%, whereas in the sub-sample 
post-July 2011, the equivalent proportion is 28.2%. Prior to July 2011, 80.9% of S&P ratings 
are lower than those from Moody’s on the same banks, 59.8% of Fitch ratings are lower than 
Moody’s ratings on the same banks. In the post- July 2011 subsample, the equivalent figures 
are 25.4% and 16.8%. 
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In summary, there is clear-cut evidence that there is a shift in market participants’ 
perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory 
regime establishment. However, it is not obvious that the shift is due to the new regulatory 
regime establishment or simply due to relative changes in rating policies and downgrade 
leadership across the CRAs themselves.5  
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
Tables 7 to 9 present the results from the multivariate investigations (i.e. estimations 
of Equations (1), (2) and (3)). The main independent variables of interest are ΔRating (i.e. 
daily changes in rating levels) and ΔRating x Dreg.change (i.e. the interaction between changes 
in rating levels and the regulatory change dummy). In the baseline models (i.e. Equations 
(1a), (2a), (3a)), the estimated coefficients of ΔRating represent the impact of rating 
downgrades on the cumulative changes in abnormal returns, Buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
intraday high-low range. The estimated coefficients of ΔRating in Equations (1b), (2b) and 
(3b) represent the impact of rating downgrades on stock returns and volatility prior to the 
regulatory regime establishment (i.e. prior to the time milestone when Dreg.change = 0). The 
estimated coefficients of the interaction term ΔRating x Dreg.change represent the impact of 
downgrades on the dependent variables in the post-July 2011 period (i.e. Dreg.change = 1). 
Table 7 reports results for Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b), i.e. impact of rating downgrades on 
CAR. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficients of S&P ΔRating and ΔRating x Dreg.change 
are insignificant in explaining the variability in CAR during most time windows. There is 
only one exception which is the interaction term during the [-1, 0] window, which indicates 
that reactions to S&P rating downgrades become more significant after the regulatory change 
in July 2011. S&P downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns of 0.9 
																																																								
5 We have also conducted equivalent investigations after excluding 43 “unclean events”, described in Section 3. 
Results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar. 
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percentage points after July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived, i.e. 
on the same day when S&P downgrades are released.   
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for Moody’s downgrades. In contrast to S&P, 
the baseline model (Eq. (1a)) shows that Moody’s downgrades are influential, whereby 
Moody’s bank downgrades induce significantly negative CAR, and the reduction is not short-
lived. The magnitude of the negative abnormal return is 1.24 percentage points within one 
week following Moody’s downgrades. The results of Eq. (1b) show that that prior to July 
2011 Moody’s bank downgrades are not significantly influential on CAR. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of the interaction term ΔRating x Dreg.change is negative and significant at 1% 
level, implying that the impact of Moody’s downgrades becomes much stronger after July 
2011. Abnormal returns of -1.37 (-5.91) percentage points are found within one day (month) 
following Moody’s downgrades in the post-July 2011 period. 
Panel C of Table 7 reports the results for Fitch rating downgrades. Similarly to 
Moody’s, the baseline model (Eq. (1a)) shows that Fitch downgrades are influential, whereby 
the abnormal return is -2.36 percentage points within one week following Fitch downgrades. 
It is worth to mention that the magnitude of the market reaction is almost double that for 
Moody’s downgrades. In Eq. (1b), the coefficients of Fitch ∆rating are negative and 
significant implying that Fitch downgrades are influential in the period prior to July 2011. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of the interaction term ΔRating x Dreg.change during [0, 5] and [0, 
22] time windows are positive and significant. The effect of the regulatory change on the 
market impact of Fitch rating downgrades is positive. In other words, the regulatory change 
has dampened the reactions to Fitch downgrades.  
Table 8 reports the results for Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) which investigate the market 
impact of downgrades on Buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Overall, the results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 7. There is clear evidence of a shift in market 
19	
participants’ perceptions of downgrades from the CRAs. S&P downgrades have insignificant 
impact on BHAR. However, the effect of the regulatory change on the impact of S&P 
downgrades is significant only during the [-1, 0] window.6 In other words, after the 
regulatory change, S&P downgrades trigger short-lived negative BHAR. After the regulatory 
change, there is evidence of strengthened negative reactions to Moody’s downgrades which is 
not short-lived. In contrast, the market impact of Fitch downgrades is weaker after the 
regulatory change, implying that the regulatory change has dampened negative reactions to 
Fitch downgrades. 
Table 9 reports the results for Eq. (3a) and Eq. (3b), which investigate the market 
impact of rating downgrades on the intraday high-low range. Panel A of Table 9 shows that 
S&P downgrades trigger short-lived increases in share price volatility (i.e. during [-1, 0], [0, 
1] time windows). The magnitude of the increases is about 0.5 percentage points, and only 
observed in the period before the regulatory change. However, the coefficients of ΔRating x 
Dreg.change variable are negative and significant during [0, 5], [0, 22] time windows, implying 
that after the regulatory change, the share price volatility is reduced by 0.63% within one 
week/month following S&P downgrades. This pattern of volatility reactions did not exist 
before the regulatory change. This lends supports to the prior analysis that the regulatory 
change might promote transparency in rating procedures, and thus enhance financial market 
stability (see Section 5.1).  
For the period before July 2011, Panel B of Table 9 shows that the banks’ share price 
volatility is reduced by 0.8 percentage points within one month following Moody’s 
downgrades. Yet, the regulatory change has altered the impact of Moody’s rating 
downgrades, whereby they trigger modest increases in volatility after July 2011. Panel C of 
																																																								
6 The estimations of Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) for time window [-1, 0] is absent from Table 8 because it would not 
differ from the results reported in Table 7 (Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) for the [-1, 0] time window).  
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Table 9 demonstrates that Fitch bank downgrades have insignificant impact on share price 
volatility before and after the regulatory change. 
In summary, there is clear evidence that there is a shift in market participants’ 
perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory 
regime establishment. The only exception is the volatility impact of Fitch downgrades, which 
are not influential before nor after the regulatory change. In general, larger banks are 
associated with more negative abnormal return and lower volatility. Banks with higher 
ratings experience more negative abnormal return and increased volatility following bank 
rating downgrades. We also carry out several robustness checks for outlier or extreme values 
which produce qualitatively similar results (available upon request). 
 
6. Conclusion  
The primary focus of this paper is to investigate whether there is any identifiable 
difference in market perceptions of rating actions by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch following the 
establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011 (i.e. ESMA taking over the ongoing 
regulatory oversight of CRAs operating in Europe). Using a sample of 44 publicly listed 
European banks which were part of the 2011 EU stress test, we examine the reactions of 
banks’ stock returns and price volatility to bank rating actions by the three largest CRAs 
during January 2008 to December 2013. The sample period is characterised by a strong bank 
rating downgrade trend as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis. We focus our empirical 
investigation (event study and regression analysis) on banks’ rating downgrades, given the 
very limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs for this sample. 
The empirical findings present mixed evidence of a shift in market perceptions of 
CRAs’ rating downgrades after the establishment of the new regulatory regime. Differentials 
in market reactions to different CRAs are identified. Firstly, S&P and Moody’s rating 
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downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns after July 2011, while these effects 
did not exist before July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived 
following S&P actions. Secondly, the regulatory change has dampened the market response 
within one week/month following bank rating downgrades by Fitch. Third, S&P downgrades 
trigger short-lived increases in share price volatility prior to regulatory change, while after the 
regulatory change the share price volatility reduces following S&P actions. In the period prior 
to July 2011, Moody’s downgrades reduce the banks’ share price volatility, while they trigger 
modest increases in the volatility after July 2011. Finally, the regulatory change did not alter 
the insignificant impact of Fitch rating downgrades on banks’ share price volatility. Overall, 
there is mixed evidence on whether the new regulatory regime has succeeded in dampening 
market reactions to rating news or promoted market stability. The shift in market perceptions 
of CRA downgrades could be due to either the new regulatory regime or changes in rating 
policies across CRAs. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effect of the new 
regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA’s responsibility for CRAs) on the market reactions to credit 
rating actions, and therefore policy makers in the EU and ESMA should be particularly 
interested in these empirical findings. The paper is also relevant to fund managers and other 
investors, especially those who focus on international diversification and who follow passive 
investment strategies. This paper considers multiple CRAs in a competitive setting and 
studies differences in their rating opinions, and hence CRAs will also be interested from a 
reputational perspective. Further, the investigation of volatility reactions is particularly 
relevant to the widespread desire for market stability.   
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Table 1- Regulatory developments in Europe which affect CRAs    
 Date Authority Event 
‘R
ea
ct
iv
e 
ph
as
e’
 
October 2007 G-7 and Central 
Banks Governors 
Request to FSF for examining causes and weaknesses which 
triggered market turmoil in 2007. 
April 2008 FSF 
Response to request from October 2007. Deficiencies of 
CRAs found in relation to structured products.  
June 2008 ESME7 
EC outlines problems with lack of competition among the 
CRAs. 
November 
2008 
G-20 summit in 
Sao Paulo 
CRAs included on the list of ‘systemically important 
institutions’. 
November 
2008 
G-20 summit in 
Washington 
Compulsory registration when providing public ratings. 
April 2009 G-20 summit in 
London 
Political agreement is reached about the CRA Regulation. 
Financial Stability Forum is re-established as Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). 
March  2009 IOSCO Review of enactment of the IOSCO 2008 Code of Conduct on 
Fundamentals for CRAs. 
December 2009  EC 
EC outlines a new set of laws aimed at CRAs. (i.e., 
registration procedures, governance requirements, internal 
controls, disclosure rules, improvement in rating 
methodologies). 
June 2010 
G-20 summit in 
Toronto 
Declaration stating need of reducing reliance on ratings in 
rules and regulations. 
October 27 
2010 FSB/G-20 
Response to June 2010 summit; release of principles 
minimising mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings (endorsed 
by G-20 states in Nov 2010). 
‘I
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
ph
as
e’
 
October 2008 
& April 2009 FSF 
Follow up reports on the implementation of proposals by 
national authorities, international bodies and private sector. 
September 16 
2009 EC 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on credit rating agencies; known as CRA 
regulation. 
July 4 2010 CESR Implementation of the Central Repository (CEREP). 
January 1 2011 ESMA 
ESMA replaces Committee of European Securities 
Regulators. 
January 1 2011 ESFS 
Establishment of European System of Financial Supervisors: 
Newly formed ESMA, EBA, EIOPA and ESRB. 
February 2011 IOSCO 
IOSCO’s Principles form a benchmark for all regulations of 
the CRAs in main jurisdictions. 
May 11 2011 
 
 EC 
Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009; 
known as CRA II regulation. 
July 1 2011 ESMA ESMA assigned with direct supervision of CRAs registered in 
																																																								
7 European Securities Market Expert replaced by ESMA in January 2011. 
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the EU. 
‘I
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
ph
as
e’
 
November 15 
2011 EC 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies; known as CRA III regulation.  
November 15 
2011 
EC 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on 
Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of the 
excessive reliance on credit ratings. 
February 7 
2012 
ESMA 
Supplementing Regulation (EC) NO 1060/2009 on fees 
charged by ESMA to CRAs. 
March 31 2012 EC 
Technical standards Supplementing Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on the: content and format of ratings data 
(no.446); assessment of compliance of methodologies 
(no.447); presentation of data (no.448); registration and 
certification (no.449). 
July 12 2012 EC 
Supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 including 
rules on fines aimed at CRAs; rights to defence and temporal 
provisions. 
July 19 2012 ESMA 
Memorandum of Understanding on the supervision of CRAs 
between ESMA and: authorities in Canada, CNV Argentina, 
SEC, MAS and ASIC. 
October 2012 FSB FSB sets Roadmap and Workshop for Reducing Reliance on 
CRA Ratings. 
November 28 
2012 
European 
Council and 
European 
Parliament 
Agreement of the trilogue of the EU rules to regulate CRAs 
(new directive). Statement by Commissioner Barnier. 
January 16 
2013 
European 
Parliament 
Rules on rating sovereign debt and private firm’s 
creditworthiness approved by Parliament. 
‘E
nh
an
ce
m
en
t p
ha
se
’ 
May 21 2013 EC 
Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit 
rating agencies (CRA III regulation); entered into force on 20 
June 2013. 
June 23 2013 ECAI 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR). 
April 28 2014 EC 
Supervisory jurisdictions of Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, 
Mexico and Singapore recognised as equivalent to the 
requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on CRAs. 
May 5 2014 EC 
Report on feasibility of a network between smaller CRAs in 
the EU. 
May 16 2014 EC 
EU publishes response to the FSB request for action plans 
aimed at minimising reliance on CRA ratings. 
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Table 2 - List of sampled banks 
 Bank Country Bank Country 
1 Allied Irish Banks Plc Ireland 23 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece 
2 Alpha Bank Greece 24 HSBC Holdings Plc UK 
3 Banco BPI, SA Portugal 25 Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A Italy 
4 Banco Comercial Portugues, SA Portugal 26 Jyske Bank Denmark 
5 Banco Popular Espanol, SA Spain 27 KBC Bank Belgium 
6 Banco de Sabadell, SA Spain 28 Lloyds Banking Group Plc UK 
7 Banco Santander, SA Spain 29 Marfin Popular Bank Cyprus 
8 Bank of Cyprus Public Co Ltd Cyprus 30 National Bank of Greece Greece 
9 Bank of Ireland Ireland 31 Nordea Bank AB Sweden 
10 Bank of Valletta Malta 32 Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor Slovenia 
11 Bankia Spain 33 Oesterreichische Volksbank AG Austria 
12 Bankinter, SA Spain 34 OTP Bank Nyrt Hungary 
13 Barclays Plc UK 35 Piraeus Bank Group Greece 
14 BNP Paribas France 36 Raiffeisen Bank International Austria 
15 Commerzbank AG Germany 37 Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK 
16 Credit Agricole France 38 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden 
17 Espirito Santo Financial Group, SA Portugal 39 Societe Generale France 
18 Danske Bank Denmark 40 Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 
19 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 41 Swedbank AB Sweden 
20 Dexia Belgium 42 Sydbank Denmark 
21 DNB ASA Norway 43 Unione di Banche Italiane S.c.p.A Italy 
22 Erste Bank Group  Austria 44 Unicredit S.p.A Italy 
This table presents the banks and their country of origin which are included in our sample. The chosen banks are those public listed banks which are part of 
the 2011 EU stress test. The sample period is from January 2008 to December 2013.  
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Table 3 - Rating events  
No. of events 
S&P Moody’s Fitch Total 
<7/2011 ≥7/2011 Σ <7/2011 ≥7/2011 Σ <7/2011 ≥7/2011 Σ <7/2011 ≥7/2011 Σ 
Downgrades 68 58 126 88 83 171 62 58 120 218 199 417 
of which                
 1-notch downgrades 50 47 97 50 47 97 47 36 83 147 130 277 
(percentage) 73.5% 81.0% 77.0% 56.8% 56.6% 56.7% 75.8% 62.1% 69.2% 67.4% 65.3% 66.4% 
 2-notch downgrades 7 11 18 23 31 54 10 19 29 40 61 101 
(percentage) 10.3% 19.0% 14.3% 26.1% 37.3% 31.6% 16.1% 32.8% 24.2% 18.3% 30.7% 24.2% 
 ≥2-notch downgrades 11 0 11 15 5 20 5 3 8 31 8 39 
(percentage) 16.2% 0.0% 8.7% 17.0% 6.0% 11.7% 8.1% 5.2% 6.7% 14.2% 4.0% 9.4% 
 
This table reports numbers of rating downgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (see Table 2) during January 2008 - December 2013. July 2011 
is the regulatory-change date, whereby ESMA was assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU. There are limited numbers of rating upgrades 
released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (i.e. 5 by S&P, 4 by Moody’s and 8 by Fitch) making empirical investigation of rating upgrades infeasible. 
 
Table 4: Response of Cumulative daily abnormal returns
Before July 2011 Post July 2011
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22] [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: S&P downgrades
Mean 0.113 -0.466 -0.850† -2.770 -1.152* -1.002 -1.131 -2.622†
t-test 0.427 0.370 0.352 0.196 0.100 0.145 0.168 0.074
sign-test 0.500 0.404 0.043 0.313 0.012 0.448 0.074 0.179
Wilcoxon 0.428 0.340 0.049 0.468 0.015 0.223 0.179 0.114
Obs 68 68 68 68 58 58 58 58
Panel B: Moody’s downgrades
Mean -0.749† -0.936† -1.501† 0.849 -0.622** -1.043*** -1.273** -5.440***
t-test 0.034 0.092 0.067 0.290 0.012 0.008 0.031 0.003
sign-test 0.334 0.500 0.334 0.099 0.018 0.049 0.049 0.057
Wilcoxon 0.101 0.253 0.183 0.131 0.003 0.016 0.040 0.003
Obs 88 88 88 88 82 82 82 82
Panel C: Fitch downgrades
Mean -1.291† -2.336† -5.954** -5.751** 0.455 0.022 1.996 2.985
t-test 0.036 0.033 0.015 0.034 0.291 0.485 0.106 0.126
sign-test 0.304 0.221 0.100 0.304 0.256 0.074 0.448 0.448
Wilcoxon 0.110 0.167 0.054 0.049 0.342 0.177 0.471 0.306
Obs 62 62 62 62 58 58 58 58
This table presents the results of the event study on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Row ’Mean’ reports
average CARs during the time windows in percentage points. Rows ’t-test’, ’sign-test’, ’Wilcoxon’ report p-
values from the respective tests. Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model using a rolling
window of [-250,-50]. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes
significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
levels. [-1,0] window captures abnormal returns in day 0. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample.
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Table 5: Response of Buy and Hold abnormal returns
Before July 2011 Post July 2011
Time window [0,1] [0,5] [0,22] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: S&P downgrades
Mean -0.138 0.385 0.032 -1.011 -1.138 -2.466†
t-test 0.457 0.410 0.495 0.144 0.170 0.067
sign-test 0.404 0.111 0.195 0.448 0.074 0.119
Wilcoxon 0.347 0.059 0.324 0.218 0.160 0.073
Obs 68 68 68 58 58 58
Panel B: Moody’s downgrades
Mean -0.883† -1.307† 0.593 -1.030*** -1.332** -5.019***
t-test 0.093 0.076 0.345 0.007 0.024 0.002
sign-test 0.500 0.196 0.142 0.049 0.049 0.012
Wilcoxon 0.224 0.143 0.227 0.012 0.023 0.001
Obs 88 88 88 82 82 82
Panel C: Fitch downgrades
Mean -2.247† -5.003** -5.032** -0.254 1.513 1.756
t-test 0.033 0.014 0.039 0.345 0.143 0.230
sign-test 0.221 0.100 0.221 0.043 0.448 0.256
Wilcoxon 0.163 0.047 0.027 0.114 0.465 0.492
Obs 62 62 62 58 58 58
This table presents the results of the event study on Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns
(BHARs). Row ’Mean’ reports average BHARs during the time windows in percentage
points. Rows ’t-test’, ’sign-test’, ’Wilcoxon’ report p-values from the respective tests.
Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model using a rolling window
of [-250, -50]. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests.
† denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data
sample.
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Table 6: Response of Cumulative daily changes in intraday ranges
Before July 2011 Post July 2011
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22] [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: S&P downgrades
Mean 0.636** 0.874† 0.214 0.761 0.244 0.603† -0.215† -0.716***
t-test 0.023 0.050 0.329 0.112 0.327 0.088 0.281 0.001
sign-test 0.198 0.452 0.272 0.500 0.145 0.347 0.074 0.006
Wilcoxon 0.042 0.235 0.315 0.385 0.148 0.345 0.019 0.000
Obs 68 68 68 68 58 58 58 58
Panel B: Moody’s downgrades
Mean -0.285 -0.989† -1.219* -0.918 -0.270 0.191† -0.058 -0.209
t-test 0.332 0.091 0.069 0.138 0.136 0.242 0.434 0.271
sign-test 0.139 0.166 0.053 0.500 0.454 0.053 0.244 0.320
Wilcoxon 0.016 0.120 0.083 0.338 0.190 0.056 0.287 0.474
Obs 88 88 88 88 82 82 82 82
Panel C: Fitch downgrades
Mean -0.612 0.092 -0.766 -1.041* -0.104 -0.974*** -0.546† -0.811**
t-test 0.156 0.452 0.116 0.064 0.394 0.002 0.091 0.019
sign-test 0.187 0.221 0.450 0.126 0.288 0.018 0.248 0.342
Wilcoxon 0.197 0.106 0.144 0.066 0.383 0.005 0.133 0.077
Obs 62 62 62 62 58 58 58 58
This table presents the results of the event study on cumulative changes in the intraday high-low range.
The range utilizes intraday high and low prices using Parkinson (1980). Row ’Mean’ reports average
cumulative changes in the range during the time windows in percentage points. Rows ’t-test’, ’sign-
test’, ’Wilcoxon’ report p-values from the respective tests. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test
and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample.
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Table 7: Response of CAR to downgrades
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions
∆Rating -0.0006 0.0022 -0.0057 -0.0037 -0.0112 -0.0109 -0.0175 -0.0115
(-0.22) (0.66) (-1.15) (-0.58) (-1.40) (-1.04) (-1.41) (-0.76)
∆Rating × DReg.change -0.0091* -0.0066 -0.0012 -0.0193
(-1.68) (-0.80) (-0.09) (-0.86)
Rating level -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0013
(-0.42) (-0.33) (-1.39) (-1.35) (-1.16) (-1.15) (-0.31) (-0.27)
Book to market 0.0018 0.0018 0.0044 0.0044 0.0051 0.0051 0.0099 0.0099
(0.81) (0.81) (0.95) (0.95) (0.83) (0.83) (1.30) (1.29)
size 0.0071 0.0080 -0.0388 -0.0382 -0.1025* -0.1024* -0.2975*** -0.2957***
(0.40) (0.45) (-0.95) (-0.92) (-1.87) (-1.85) (-3.36) (-3.30)
cons -0.1317 -0.1446 0.5850 0.5757 2.3469* 2.3440* 6.5631*** 6.5154***
(-0.47) (-0.51) (0.91) (0.89) (1.89) (1.87) (3.29) (3.23)
Obs. 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.18
Panel B: Reactions to Moody’s actions
∆Rating -0.0045** -0.0024 -0.0075** -0.0023 -0.0124** -0.0086 -0.0150 0.0074
(-2.40) (-0.92) (-2.58) (-0.65) (-2.28) (-1.17) (-1.64) (0.71)
∆Rating × DReg.change -0.0055* -0.0137*** -0.0099 -0.0591***
(-1.73) (-2.96) (-1.16) (-3.25)
Rating level -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0008 0.0007
(-0.99) (-1.01) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.92) (0.21) (0.18)
Book to market 0.0018 0.0018 0.0037 0.0037 0.0040 0.0040 0.0100 0.0102
(0.89) (0.89) (0.86) (0.87) (0.69) (0.69) (1.37) (1.39)
size -0.0133 -0.0131 -0.0231 -0.0226 -0.0371 -0.0367 -0.1739*** -0.1691***
(-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-3.12) (-3.03)
cons 0.3100 0.3052 0.5488 0.5367 0.6513 0.6475 2.7178*** 3.7687***
(0.95) (0.93) (1.05) (1.03) (1.34) (1.34) (3.12) (3.00)
Obs. 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562
R2 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.17
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Table 7 - Continued
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions
∆Rating -0.0045 -0.0093* -0.0119** -0.0206** -0.0236* -0.0578*** -0.0125 -0.0473**
(-1.61) (-1.94) (-2.19) (-2.18) (-1.82) (-2.63) (-0.85) (-2.02)
∆Rating × DReg.change 0.0089 0.0161 0.0628*** 0.0640**
(1.53) (1.64) (2.82) (2.48)
Rating level 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0062** -0.0047* -0.0025 -0.0010
(0.18) (0.37) (-1.50) (-1.24) (-2.10) (-1.71) (-0.53) (-0.22)
Book to market 0.0028 0.0028 0.0049 0.0049 0.0045 0.0042 0.0104 0.0101
(1.28) (1.26) (1.12) (1.10) (0.75) (0.70) (1.41) (1.37)
size -0.0186 -0.0169 -0.0218 -0.0188 -0.0919** -0.0801* -0.2665*** -0.2544***
(-1.02) (-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-2.09) (-1.94) (-3.84) (-3.78)
cons 0.4061 0.3693 0.4996 0.4076 1.4993** 1.2965** 4.1912*** 3.9847***
(1.00) (0.92) (0.94) (0.79) (2.17) (2.01) (3.84) (3.76)
Obs. 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 512
R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.19
This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (1a) and (1b). The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns
during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust
standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full
sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported
for sake of presentation.
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Table 8: Response of Buy and Hold Abnormal returns to downgrades
Time window [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions
∆Rating -0.0050 -0.0026 -0.0073 -0.0061 -0.0093 0.0009
(-1.07) (-0.44) (-1.10) (-0.72) (-0.86) (0.07)
∆Rating × DReg.change -0.0076 -0.0039 -0.0327*
(-1.00) (-0.34) (-1.65)
Rating level -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0007
(-1.39) (-1.33) (-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.23) (-0.16)
Book to market 0.0038 0.0038 0.0032 0.0032 0.0085 0.0085
(0.97) (0.97) (0.73) (0.73) (1.43) (1.42)
size -0.0318 -0.0310 -0.0766* -0.0762* -0.1880*** -0.1842***
(-0.89) (-0.86) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-3.01) (-2.93)
cons 0.4753 0.4645 1.7616* 1.7518* 2.8217*** 2.7604***
(0.85) (0.82) (1.80) (1.78) (2.85) (2.76)
Obs. 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.18
Panel B: Reactions to Moody’s actions
∆Rating -0.0075*** -0.0023 -0.0116** -0.0076 -0.0125 0.0077
(-2.63) (-0.67) (-2.26) (-1.10) (-1.47) (0.80)
∆Rating × DReg.change -0.0134*** -0.0105 -0.0533***
(-2.98) (-1.27) (-3.32)
Rating level -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0007 0.0006
(-0.93) (-0.96) (-0.74) (-0.75) (0.21) (0.17)
Book to market 0.0032 0.0033 0.0026 0.0026 0.0089 0.0091
(0.89) (0.90) (0.62) (0.63) (1.56) (1.57)
size -0.0236 -0.0232 -0.0368 -0.0364 -0.1447*** -0.1403***
(-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-2.89) (-2.80)
cons 0.5606 0.5487 0.6528 0.6488 2.2540*** 3.1228***
(1.10) (1.08) (1.32) (1.31) (2.89) (2.78)
Obs. 562 562 562 562 562 562
R2 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.16
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Table 8 - Continued
Time window [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions
∆Rating -0.0119** -0.0198** -0.0195* -0.0483*** -0.0070 -0.0364*
(-2.25) (-2.15) (-1.81) (-2.74) (-0.51) (-1.84)
∆Rating × DReg.change 0.0144 0.0529*** 0.0542**
(1.49) (2.86) (2.31)
Rating level -0.0024* -0.0021 -0.0058** -0.0046* -0.0018 -0.0005
(-1.67) (-1.42) (-2.14) (-1.78) (-0.40) (-0.12)
Book to market 0.0042 0.0042 0.0028 0.0026 0.0085 0.0082
(1.15) (1.13) (0.65) (0.59) (1.51) (1.47)
size -0.0162 -0.0135 -0.0782* -0.0682* -0.2028*** -0.1926***
(-0.69) (-0.58) (-1.93) (-1.76) (-3.28) (-3.17)
cons 0.3743 0.2874 1.2805** 1.1097* 3.1732*** 2.9984***
(0.71) (0.56) (2.02) (1.84) (3.25) (3.13)
Obs. 512 512 512 512 512 512
R2 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17
This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (2a) and (2b). The dependent variable is Buy-
and-Hold abnormal returns during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used
for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and
3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake
of presentation.
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Table 9: Cumulative changes in intraday range in response to downgrades
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions
∆Rating 0.0049*** 0.0057*** 0.0046** 0.0052** 0.0009 0.0028 0.0001 0.0021
(2.74) (2.71) (2.30) (2.07) (0.41) (1.13) (0.06) (0.66)
∆Rating × DReg.change -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0063* -0.0063*
(-0.85) (-0.54) (-1.76) (-1.67)
Rating level 0.0003 0.0004 0.0015** 0.0015** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0010 0.0011
(0.49) (0.53) (2.35) (2.38) (0.76) (0.85) (1.26) (1.35)
Book to market -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.90) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-0.50) (-0.48)
size -0.0039 -0.0036 0.0174 0.0176 -0.0082 -0.0076 0.0287 0.0293*
(-0.44) (-0.40) (1.06) (1.06) (-0.57) (-0.52) (1.62) (1.65)
cons 0.0882 0.0813 -0.4187 -0.4242 0.1175 0.1071 -0.6334 -0.6484
(0.42) (0.39) (-1.14) (-1.14) (0.52) (0.47) (-1.56) (-1.60)
Obs. 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 524
R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Panel B: Reactions to Moody’s actions
∆Rating -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0064 -0.0050 -0.0071 -0.0043 -0.0080*
(-0.06) (-0.36) (-1.04) (-1.52) (-1.46) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.67)
∆Rating × DReg.change 0.0031 0.0095** 0.0055 0.0099*
(0.73) (1.99) (0.95) (1.75)
Rating level 0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0022** 0.0022**
(2.44) (2.45) (2.59) (2.65) (2.57) (2.59) (2.47) (2.52)
Book to market -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0005
(-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.01) (-1.03) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-0.65) (-0.70)
size -0.0157* -0.0158* -0.0126 -0.0129 -0.0340*** -0.0342*** -0.0036 -0.0044
(-1.69) (-1.68) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-2.77) (-2.74) (-0.21) (-0.26)
cons 0.3346 0.3371 0.2603 0.2681 0.5145*** 0.5168*** 0.0656 0.0847
(1.62) (1.61) (0.96) (0.97) (2.73) (2.71) (0.17) (0.22)
Obs. 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568
R2 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
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Table 9 - Continued
Time window [-1,0] [0,1] [0,5] [0,22]
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions
∆Rating 0.0006 -0.0019 0.0018 0.0055 -0.0011 0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0028
(0.28) (-0.58) (0.65) (1.08) (-0.45) (0.18) (-0.53) (-0.62)
∆Rating × DReg.change 0.0046 -0.0069 -0.0034 0.0027
(1.18) (-1.33) (-0.82) (0.53)
Rating level 0.0010 0.0011 0.0017** 0.0015** 0.0011 0.0010 0.0020** 0.0021**
(1.51) (1.61) (2.37) (2.08) (1.50) (1.37) (2.41) (2.37)
Book to market -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0007
(-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.34) (-1.32) (-1.11) (-1.14)
size -0.0207** -0.0198** -0.0073 -0.0086 -0.0230** -0.0236** -0.0038 -0.0033
(-2.14) (-2.13) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-2.43) (-2.54) (-0.22) (-0.20)
cons 0.3052** 0.2909** 0.0918 0.1134 0.3382** 0.3486** 0.0417 0.0331
(2.02) (1.99) (0.44) (0.56) (2.27) (2.40) (0.16) (0.13)
Obs. 518 518 518 518 518 518 518 518
R2 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10
This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (3a) and (3b). The dependent variable is cumulative changes
in the intraday high-low range during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of
interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-
matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies
and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation.
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